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  1Abstract 
  
Since the mid-1980s, more regional trade arrangements (RTAs) have arisen between developing 
and developed countries than before. The evidence shows that MNCs are the major driving force 
of the new regionalism. The puzzle presented in this paper is why MNCs would like to propel new 
RTAs between developing and developed countries. The paper believes that the emergence and 
development of new regionalism is, to a great extent, related to the situation that MNCs wish to 
enter into developing countries’ markets. However, it is not easy for MNCs to access to this 
developing market. MNCs still have to be faced with challenges brought about by both their more 
and more public-good-like ownership advantages and the increasing cost of producing ownership 
advantages. If MNCs did not extend their market to the developing countries, they would not 
spread the cost of producing ownership advantages. However, if they did, they would face the 
risk that their property of public goods is freely ridden by developing countries due to no effective 
intellectual property protection (IPP). Therefore, MNCs have to produce much demand for 
building up new RTAs including developing countries to protect their ownership advantages, 
especially when they meet the difficulties in multinational negotiation in IPP. 
  
With regard to the case of East Asian region, East Asian production pattern of the vertical division 
of labor or a production base leads to low extent of regional marketization and also demands little 
for regional institutionalization, at least from the demand perspective of regional integration. In 
East Asia, Japan has been keeping the highest level of industrial technologies while other East 
Asian members still in the phase of “learning” rather than innovation, or still technology-
dependent economies. Due to lack of common interest, especially in IPP, there is not a real 
example of new regionalism in East Asia. East Asia needs to resolve some regional structural 
problems such as transforming the economic structure from the production base to the market; 
establishing the regional market institution and encouraging innovative activities. Some good 
signs have shown changes in regional structure such as China emergence as a rising market, 
accumulation of ownership advantages in East Asian firms from developing economies and 
improvement of Japanese technological transfer. With the transformation of regional structure, 
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By Zhao Jianglin 
                    
Since the mid-1980s, more regional trade arrangements (RTAs) between developing and 
developed countries have arisen than before. If we explain this phenomenon within the 
framework of old regionalism, we have to meet some difficulties. For example, why did these 
RTAs (between developing countries and developed countries) seldom take place in the past? In 
order to explain it, new variables must be considered. Now that RTAs have been made between 
countries, transnational factor should be first considered. Till now, one of the most important, or 
essential transnational forces in the area of international political economy are multinational 
corporations (MNCs). The contribution of MNCs to new regionalism has caused much research. 
Based on the supply and demand model of regionalism, Mattli argued that old regionalism was a 
product supplied and demanded by states while new regionalism is the result of both the demand 
of the market force, especially big businesses and the supply of the governments,[1] which shows 
that MNCs become the major driving force of the new regionalism. 
  
The puzzle presented in this paper is why MNCs become a driving force to forge these new RTAs 
between developing and developed countries in the stage of new regionalism. As will be shown in 
the paper, the study on the demand for regionalism is focused, based on the theory of firm trade 
preference. However, unlike other research, this paper will argue that ownership advantage of 
MNCs is an essential factor, which leads MNCs to demand for new regional policy and hence 
promote the emergence and development of these new RTAs. 
  
This paper includes five sections. The first section presents the background of the study. The 
second section overviews the literature of the effects of MNCs on new regionalism. The third 
section provides some explanation why MNCs demand for regional integration, especially RTAs 
between developing and developed countries. The forth section is to apply the framework to the 
process of the East-Asian regional integration. The fifth section is the conclusion. 
  
I. Two Famous phenomena 
  
1. New Development of Regionalism since 1980s 
  
No matter what we define regionalism,[2] it has enjoyed two climaxes for the recent fifty years. 
The first regionalism, called “old regionalism,”[3] started in West Europe, Latin America and Africa 
in the 1950s when the beginning of the Cold War appeared, and ended in 1970s. For example, 
the Treaty of Rome, born in 1958, was formulated by major regional countries such as French 
  4and West German in order to keep regional peace. Starting from the 1980s, particularly in the 
early 1990s, regionalism entered into a new phase of development, which called “new 
regionalism”. More and more countries joined various schemes of regional integration, and 
moreover, various kinds of regionalisms, formal or informal, institutional or non-institutional, 
spread all over the world, particularly in West Europe, North American and Asia-Pacific regions. 
Up to December 2002, about 250 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO, of which 130 were 
notified after January 1995. Now there are over 170 RTAs being in force and an additional 70 are 
estimated to be operational in spite of not being notified yet. By the end of 2005, it is estimated 
that the total number of RTAs in force might well amount to 300.[4] It seems that no sign appears 
that this process of new regionalism will stop in the near future (See Chart 1). 
 
Chart 1 Evolution of RTAs in the world, 1948-2002 
  
Number of RTAs 
Source: www.wto.org 
  
Compared with old regionalism, one of characteristics of new regionalism is that a lot of recent 
RTAs have been established between developing countries and developed countries (See table 
1).[5] Such RTAs are shown in the enlargement of EU, the establishment of NAFTA and the 
emergence of APEC. It is well known that the participants of the old regionalism usually had a 
similar level of economic development while those of the new regionalism are very “mixed” and 
participants of different level of economic development and different economic scale could join 
the same RTA[6]. Hettne pointed out that “even the core regions contain their own centre-
periphery or North-South Cleavages.”[7] Of course, not all developing countries are linking up 
with developed countries but those who are neighbors of developed countries or who are of great 
significance to developed countries join RTAs suggested by developed countries. 
 
Table 1: the number of RTAs currently in force with developing countries, 2003 
Number of regional trade agreements  Country or region 
Total in force With developing 
country partners 
With developing country 
partners, formed since 1989 
United State  4  3  3 
European Union  50  35  31 
Canada 5  4  4 
Japan 2  0  0 
Australia and New Zealand  4  0  0 
  5European Free Trade Area  24  21  17 
Agreements between 
developing country partners 
76 76  68 
Other 19  -  - 
Total 184  139  123 
Note: NAFTA is included for both the U.S. and Canada. 
Source: Mary E. Burfisher; Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder, “Regionalism: Old and 
New, Theory and Practice”, MTID Discussion Paper NO. 65. Feb., 2004. Http:// www. Ifpri.org. 
  
Why are there so many RTAs between developing and developed countries since the 1980s? 
How do we explain the phenomenon? 
  
2. Development of MNCs since 1980s 
  
Before the end of Cold War, transactional forces including MNCs and NGOs have begun to play 
an increasing role in the international economic and political activities. In the field of international 
political economy, some studies concluded that the relationship between the market and the state 
has changed dramatically before or after the end of Cold War: the market forces have not been 
confined within one country and have broken through the national bounder and spread regionally, 
and even globally. Among the market forces, the most salient is MNCs. 
  
From the beginnings of 1970s, MNCs have become an important economic power in the world in 
terms of various economic indicators. In 1970, there were some 7,000 parent TNCs. Today the 
total number of parent TNCs is at least 61,000 with over 900,000 foreign affiliates.[8] Both FDI by 
MNCs and growth of total assets of foreign affiliates show the change in MNCs’ economic power 
(See Chart 2 and 3). Till now the economic power of MNCs has gone beyond that of states. For 
example, the gross production of MNCs’ foreign affiliates (US$3706 billions) is about equal to the 
volume of import (US$ 3772 billions) of the first seven leading countries (U.S., Germany, China, 
U.K., France, Japan, and Italy) or more than the volume of export (US$ 3659 billions) of the first 
eight leading countries (Germany, U.S., Japan, China, France, U.K., Netherlands and Italy) in 
2003. Usually annul value of production by a large-scaled MNCs exceeds GDP of an average 
developing country during the whole year. MNCs’ economic activities have spread into every 
corner of the world and integrated the world economies into an unhistorical interdependent 
statue. Of course, the distribution of MNCs in the world is unbalanced (See table 2). MNCs are 
mainly concentrated in the economically developed region, such as EU, U.S. and Japan. 
  
Chart2 FDI inflows, global and by group of countries, 1980-2003 (Billions of dollars) 
  6Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD, 2004, P3. 
  
Chart 3 Total assets of foreign affiliates: value at current prices (Billions US$) 
  
Source: World Investment Report 2003 
   
Table 2  Transnational Corporations - Number and Location，1997 
Region Parent  Corporations 
  Based in Region 
Foreign Affiliates 
  Based in Region 
World 53,607  448,917 
Developed Economies  43,442  96,620 
Developing Economies  9,323  230,696 
European Union  27,846  54,875 
United States  3,379  18,901 
Japan 4,231  3,014 
China 379  145,000 
Latin America  1,109  21,174 
Africa 32  330 
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD 1998. 
  
As early as in 1970s, MNCs have been regarded as one of “new actors” in the world 
economy.[9] Nye argued that the rise of the MNCs have been particularly significant from the 
second half of the 20
th century due to their scale, their direct effect on relocation of production, 
their flexibility in response to a central strategy (which weakens government controls), and their 
effect on other transnational actors such as labor union, bank and others who have to follow the 
lead of MNCs.[10] Servan-Schreiber also described the overwhelming power of the modern 
international firms.[11]Jones applied the term “global business actors” to private corporate actors 
that control operations or income-generating assets in more than one country, i.e. MNCs.[12]
  
Due to their economic power, MNCs become new “authority” of changing international political 
economy. Ruigrok pointed out that since the second half of the 1980s their importance has 
increased dramatically so that their economic activities are more and more beyond control by 
governments.[13] Sampson contended that MNCs “have grown up outside the framework of the 
nation itself.”[14] Under embedded liberalism, the state is actually a “retreat” from the 
market,[15] or a “withering away of the state.”[16] Ohmae argued that market forces such as 
TNCs increasingly become important sources of authority in the global political economy, both in 
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not only have “visions” of organizing economic activities, affecting external actors, but also have 
political visions; and it is omission to consider them as actors basically being engaged in 
economic transactions, as “masters of the market”.[18] Some political scientists found that it is too 
restricting only to focus the study on the nation-state and developed an alterative model that 
includes MNCs as actors in world politics.[19] George Modelski wrote that “Corporation are an 
important part of present and future international systems and, even though we need not think of 
them as becoming governmental organizations in their own right, their political functions as 
structural components of systems of world politics can be neglected at our peril.”[20]
In summary, new regionalism’s appearance must be attributed to new factor --- MNCs, or we 
could not distinguish between old and new regionalism and could not explain why new 
regionalism developed so fast. As Robert Z. Lawrence notes, 
The forces driving the current developments differ radically from those driving previous waves of 
regionalism in this century. Unlike the episode of the 1930s, the current initiatives represent 
efforts to facilitate their members’ participation in the world economy rather than their withdrawal 
from it. Unlike those in the 1950s and 1960s, the initiatives involving developing countries are part 
of a strategy to liberalize and open their economies to implement export-and foreign-investment-
led policies rather than to promote import substitution.[21]
  
II. Effects of MNCs on New Regionalism 
  
In much literature, there existed study on the relationship between MNCs and regionalism. 
Robson argued that “the relationship between cross-border business integration through 
operations of TNCs and regional integration is an intimate one.”[22] This paper discusses mainly 
effects of MNCs on RTAs, not the reverse; therefore the literature will be overviewed in this 
aspect. 
  
Before or in the 1970s, there has not existed a basic conclusion on effects of MNCs on 
regionalism although their effects have been noted. Before 1970s, some authors pointed out 
those MNCs beyond national boundaries helped make the Treaty of Rome an economic 
reality.[23] Similarly, “Within the Latin American Free Trade Zone foreign firms, such as IBM, 
Olivetti, and Ford, show greater integration zeal than most domestic 
entrepreneurs.”[24] However, the conclusion of research in the 1970s is very vague on the role of 
MNCs in regional integration since there is no or seldom direct evidence to show that MNCs 
strengthen “process forces” and improve conditions of integration or disintegration responded by 
national governments. Nye concluded that MNCs are maybe a potentially important machine of 
integration and at the same time, extra-regional enterprises may weaken some forces and 
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analyses of regionalism processes largely due to the fact that “global business basically rose to 
prominence in the 1970s when the ‘first wave’ of regionalism had already come to an 
end.”[26] Until about the mid-1980s, it is begun to note that the European MNCs stressed more 
on the European continent and lobbied more for a European regionalism than before.[27]
  
In the mid-1980s, it is increasingly obvious that MNCs have risen to a major driving force behind 
the regionalism, which caused much concern in the academic area. Cerny contended that “in 
attempting to adapt to a range of complex changes in cultural, institutional and market structures, 
both political and market actors are increasingly seeking, directly or indirectly, wittingly or 
unwittingly, to reinvent political structures and institutions in a wider global context.”[28] Mattli 
constructed a model of successful regional integration where there are two sets of conditions 
must be satisfied if integration is to succeed, namely, demand-side and supply-side conditions. 
The supply-side condition is from the political leaders in the region to engage in particular courses 
of action to realize the economies of their countries closer together. The demand comes from “the 
bottom, that is, market actors who stand to reap large gains from transacting in increasingly 
integrated economies. This demand for regional rules, regulations, and policies is a crucial driving 
force of integration”.[29] Weintraub also argued that the simplest economic explanation is that 
regional institutes follow underlying trade and investment flows; the deeper these flows, the 
greater the demand for regional institutes to manage them[30]. 
  
The evidence also showed the driving role of MNCs in building up new regionalism. An increase 
in MNCs’ lobbying activities at the international level, mainly done by business associations, 
brought about the strong pressure for common rules and external safeguards. More and more 
“official positions” of firms and business associations appeared in the domestic political structure 
or regional institutions.[31] Take examples. All of the major American umbrella 
organizations,[32] representing the interests of American corporations, expressed support for 
deeper integration in North American[33] and become the crucial political force behind NAFTA. 
Even in the Asia-Pacific region where till now there has never been institutional building, there still 
existed a Business Advisory Council to present their suggestions on the regional cooperation to 
the regional political leaders. In fact, to a great extent, without efforts of the regional MNCs from 
Japan, U.S. and other economies, it is almost impossible to build a regional organization --- 
APEC in such a diverse region of different level of economic development, different political, 
social and cultural structure. Urata summarized the role of Japanese FDI in linking together East-
Asia, such as know-how spillovers, building sale and procurement and information networks to 
connect the members of East-Asia and promote intra-regional trade.[34] As for EU that has a 
historical tradition of regional integration, the role of MNCs in enlarging EU and deepening 
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neglected even. Malti argued that the “re-launching” of European integration in the mid-1980s is 
in great part attributable to pressure from the business community. European industrialists were 
the first to campaign for a single European market at a time of rapid technological change, even 
before the EC[35]. The European Round Table (ERT) of European industrialists, formed in 1983, 
a group comprising Europe’s largest and most influential corporations, became a powerful lobby 
vis-à-vis the national governments. In one of their first meetings, the members of ERT concluded 
that “in reality, despite ambitions to liberalize trade, and the measures taken by the EEC, Europe 
remains a group of separate national markets with separated national policies and separated 
industrial structures. This prevents many firms from reaching the scale necessary to resist 
pressure from non-European competitors.”[36]Thomsen argued that based on the data of 
regional trade and FDI, the growing regional integration that we observe, orchestrated in large 
part by MNCs, is a natural result of geographical and cultural proximity, not the outcome of 
political negotiations.[37]
  
Why do MNCs pursue a regionalized policy? Globally operating MNCs should be for a multilateral 
trading system due to an increasing interest in the global economy. But since the mid-late 1980s 
they are also more and more concerned about regional arrangements which always have a 
feature of closing to the economies outside to a different degree and diverting principles of the 
liberalizing trading order. It seems a paradox. 
  
According to the standard economic analysis, for firms in perfectly competitive markets, the 
welfare-maximizing outcome is free trade globally rather than other trade policy, including 
domestic protection or regional trade preferable arrangements. Therefore, MNCs prefer freer 
trade policy to trade barriers, which is proved by Helen Milner.[38] She argued that firms of 
international ties other than domestic firms intend to resist protection even in the economic 
distress. Along this line of research, MNCs, as firms of globally production and sale networks, 
would help build up not regional trade arrangements or domestic protection but a globally free 
trade system. Hillman and Ursprung also concluded that “increased multinational presence has a 
liberalizing influence on the determination of international trade policy—evidently via the 
incentives for free trade deriving from international vertical integration, and also—perhaps less 
evidently but as our model demonstrates—when multinational operation takes the form of 
horizontal integration.”[39]
  
However, Robson argued that within the framework of orthodox theory, there is no scope for a 
formal analysis of the interaction between regional integration and MNCs, since firms, ownership 
internalization considerations are entirely disregarded. Burfisher, et, pointed out that 
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explanation of development of new regionalism, almost all of analyses are pointed to economic 
activities related to MNCs.[40] Since the 1980s, the new development of theories of both trade 
and industrial organization has opened the way to a systematic consideration of the regional 
integration and MNCs.[41] The new theory of international trade shows that the market is not 
perfect, the scale economy is not constant but increasing, so MNCs trade gain may come from 
the imperfect market structure, that is, increasing scale of economy is one part of gains MNCs 
can get. MNCs of different nature have different trade preference demand. Milner argued that 
firms lacking scale economies or with constant returns to scale would prefer export-oriented 
(Multilateral trade liberalization) or import-competing (home protection) while firms with increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) should be the ones who pursue regional strategy. 
  
In her later paper, Milner argued that as industries have become increasingly global and 
government intervention more pervasive, corporate trade demands have moved away from the 
standard poles of free trade and protectionism toward a more complex response, called strategic 
trade policy.[42] Changing market conditions and government policy make corporate trade 
demand from unconditional in favor of free trade policy to conditional in favor of free trade policy 
or in favor of protectionism or strategic trade policy. Therefore it is obvious that MNCs do not 
always pursue multinational trade preferable arrangements although MNCs would treat free trade 
as their first best option. 
  
In fact, to a great extent, new regionalism reflected MNCs’ responses to accessing not only to the 
developed markets but also to the newly emerging markets of developing countries. As we know, 
MNCs have been speeding the process of regionalization since the 1980s. Das argued that 
MNCs require complete harmonization of other policies including competition policies, product 
standards, regulatory regimes, investment codes, environmental policies.[43] This seldom 
appeared in old regionalism provided by governments because governments have played a 
limited role in the economic activities and therefore could not demand so much for common rules 
and standards. Cutler et al argued that it is individual firms that are establishing international 
framework for their economic activities, now captured with the concept of “international private 
authority”, as a market-oriented source of authority. The setting up of private sector regimes 
creates areas of rule-making, standards-setting and organization of industrial 
sectors.[44] Therefore RTAs of new regionalism have been involved “deep integration” or having 
more developing countries joining the RTAs and enacting common standards or rules with the 
developed countries: the partners seldom confine themselves to reducing or eliminating trade 
barriers, but also harmonize or adjust diverse assortments of other economic policies.[45] The EU 
is a clear and dramatic example of this change. In 1997, early voluntary sectoral liberalization 
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regionalism includes the following items (1) facilitating factors such as capital flows and labor 
movement; (2) harmonizing domestic policies such as tax and subsidy policies and harmonizing 
macroeconomic policies; (3) establishing institutions to manage and facilitate integration such as 
regional development funds, institutions to set standards, and dispute resolution mechanisms; 
(4)improvement of communications and transportation infrastructure to facilitate increased trade 
and factor mobility and harmonizing legal regulation of product and factor markets. 
  
Compared with old regionalism, the welfare from new regionalism is multi-dimension and is larger 
than those brought about by old regionalism since MNCs demand stricter requirements of the 
market along with their economic activities deepening. According to the study conducted by EU, it 
shows that the resource allocation benefits from reduced internal trade barriers are indeed small, 
even allowing for the liberalization of public procurement decisions which remain a major source 
of national preference;  of roughly equal importance are the three other components, that is 
elimination of internal cost-increasing restrictions such as excessive regulations, fragmented 
standards, and border controls; greater competition arising from the integration of segmented 
imperfectly competitive markets and scale economies.[47] As Spindler put forward, the market 
logic in new regionalism is in essence a matter of competitiveness and openness, promoting the 
imperatives of deregulation, privatization and restriction of public intervention in economic 
process. To some degree, global business circles advocate a specific type of a regionalized world 
(while at the same time promoting a transnational, globalizing economic system). In this process, 
regionalism becomes “infused” with the logic of the market inherent in the concepts and ideas of 
globalizing forces and a “Marketisation” of the region appeared. These “Market concepts” of 
regionalism keep on “fighting” and competing with prevailing older protectionist concepts inherent 
in old style regionalism and in the long run might transform them into new regional structure.[48]
  
Roughly speaking, some literature has provided effects of MNCs on new regionalism. But there is 
seldom explanation on cooperation between developing and developed countries by using the 
variable of MNCs. This paper tries to do this and believes that ownership advantages of MNCs 
are facing increasing challenges from two aspects. One is that their ownership advantages are 
more and more of public goods while the other is that the cost of producing ownership 
advantages is going up increasingly. If MNCs do not extend their market to the developing 
countries, they will not reduce the cost of producing ownership advantages. However, if they do, 
they will face the risk that their property of public goods is freely ridden by developing countries. 
Due to the multilateral difficulties, MNCs have to produce much demand for building up new 
RTAs including developing countries to protect their ownership advantages. 
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1. Change of MNCs’ Ownership Advantages 
  
That MNCs have become multinational firms is because MNCs have their specific ownership 
advantage which seldom belongs to other kinds of firms such as domestic firms or export-
oriented firms to help them operate well in host countries. In Dunning’s OLI electric paradigm, 
ownership-specific advantage is one of MNCs’ three advantages to producing abroad rather than 
at home. Jorstmann and Markusen also concluded that “ownership advantages are a crucial 
determinant of multi-nationality.”[49] With the advancement of technology, this kind of most 
important or essential asset has changed from tangible such as capitals to intangible such as 
intellectual assets (See table 3). Dunning has further cataloged two kinds of intangible assets in 
terms of relevance to internalization. One is unessential to be internalized such as most patents 
and trademarks, and some management marketing, financial and organizational assets. The 
other is essential to be internalized within the firm and not saleable to other firms. This includes 
the genuine joint economies of hierarchical activities, for example, product and process 
integration, the spreading of managerial and technological capacity, the reduction in transaction 
costs and the gains arising from asset, product or market diversification.[50]
  
Till now, intangible assets have become the source of both core competence and profits for 
MNCs. Dunning argued that the competitive advantages of a country’s enterprises in serving 
foreign markets is determined both by firms’ ownership advantages, relative to those of 
enterprises of other nationalities, and the location advantages of the countries where they 
produce, relative to those of other countries.[51] Compared with host countries, especially the 
developing countries, MNCs have not owned low cost of physical capital or labor. The main or 
even only ownership advantage of MNCs is intangible assets. The large empirical literature on 
MNCs repeatedly found that MNCs are associated with the existence of knowledge-based, firm-
specific assets. The evidence shows that an industry tends to have a greater proportion of MNCs 
when the output of that industry is characterized by R&D, marketing expenditures, scientific and 
technical workers, product newness and complexity, and product differentiation. At an abroad 




Table 3  Changing characteristics of assets 
   Specific to ownership  Accessed by firms  Organized by firms 
Pre  •Land, property  •Labor, materials  •Internal to households 
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•Growth of joint ventures 















•Hierarchical within firms 





(Accelerated movement towards the global or regional creation, accessing and 
utilization of assets) 
Source: John Dunning, “Theories and Paradigms of International Business Activity”, Edward 
Elgar, 2002, pp 477. 
  
Knowledge-based intangible assets bring about MNCs the following advantages. First, as 
Markusen argued, knowledge often has a joint character, like a public good, in that it can be 
supplied to additional production facilities at very low cost. Blueprints, chemical formulae and 
pharmaceuticals, trademarks, and other marketing devices all have this characteristic. The joint-
input characteristic of knowledge-based assets has implications for the efficiency of the firm and 
for market structure.[53] Second, knowledge - based assets can be transferred easily back and 
forth across space at low cost. For example, technological personnel can visit many separate 
production facilities at a relatively low cost.[54] Third, MNCs often possesses considerable market 
power from the “advanced” knowledge, which implies that the latter may extract considerable 
monopoly rent as payment for the services of its assets. Therefore, MNCs become exporters of 
the services of firm-specific assets while a host country gets the benefits of the MNCs’ technical 
and managerial expertise.[55]
  
MNCs’ ownership advantages have their own weaknesses. On the one hand, different from 
tangible assets, MNCs’ ownership-specific advantages are more and more of public goods rather 
than private goods with the technological progress. For example, know-how can often be used in 
another enterprise without being substantially impaired. Thus the transaction costs are very high 
for market transactions of these “public-good-like” intangible assets without effective institutional 
devices for facilitating trading in these assets.[56] If they enter into an “imperfect” market without 
effective intellectual property protection (IPP) in the host countries, MNCs have to be faced with 
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countries, the firm may not enjoy a net cost or revenue differential over its domestic rivals, if its 
advantages can’t be deployed at zero or a low marginal cost in the host country.[57] Of course, 
external markets for all intangible assets are not subject to the same degree of market failure, 
hence transaction costs vary. 
On the other hand, MNCs have to be forced with the pressure from the going-up cost of 
producing ownership advantages, especially, with global diffusion of technologies and innovation 
increasing rapidly. For an example, the growth rate of U.S. expenditure on R&D outpaces that of 
GDP except the years of 1993 and 2002, which means that it is more expensive for U.S. to create 
the same growth rate of GDP (see Chart 4). In order to spread the cost of innovation, it is more 
important for the products of innovation to access to the more market as soon as possible than 
before. MNCs began to appear in the liberalizing developing economies except in the developed 
countries and relocate their production in different countries in a more cost-effective manner such 
as sourcing of raw materials in some countries, producing the labor-intensive products in other 
countries and keeping most of major R&D activities in their home countries. 
  
Chart4 Growth rate of real R&D expenditure and GDP from 1980 to 2003(percent) 
Source: Barbara M. Franmeni and Sumiye Okubo, “R&D in the National Income and Product 
Accounts: A First Look at its Effect on GDP”, WP 2002-01, www. bea.gov/bea/papers/R&D-
NIPA.pdf. 
  
2. Limits of MNCs’ Internal Market 
  
MNCs’ internal market can partly resolve the externality problems led by the “public-good-like” 
nature of their own intangible assets. The modern theory of FDI suggests that MNCs’ internal 
market is developed in response to imperfections in the goods or factor markets and hence 
MNCs’ ownership advantages can be transported between the home and the host nation within 
the internal market. Pearce has identified a positive relationship between R&D intensity and 
internalization.[58] The internal market allows proprietary information to be used efficiently, 
especially in the case of a classic externality where the market mechanism fails to set a price for 
the private production and dissemination of knowledge. FDI is one of outcomes of intangible 
assets (advantages) being internalized by MNCs.[59] At the same time, some organizational 
techniques are created to serve the purpose of internalizing externalities, such as vertical 
integration, and long-term licensing agreements[60] For example, in order to curb piracy, Texas 
Instruments, International Business Machines Corporation, and Microsoft Corporation all have 
become partners with local industries in Taiwan through licensing agreements for computer 
hardware, software, and chip production.[61] Mansfield and Romeo, based on obtained 
  15information concerning the age of the technology transferred abroad by 31 U.S.-based MNCs, 
found that the average age of the technologies transferred through licenses, joint ventures, and 
channels other than subsidiaries is commonly higher than that of the technologies transferred to 
subsidiaries, indicating that firms tend to transfer their newest technology overseas through 
wholly owned subsidiaries rather than via licenses or joint venture, but the latter channels 
become more important as the technology becomes older.[62]
  
However, based on the theory of the transaction cost, internalization has its own transaction cost, 
which means internalization plays a limited role in overcoming the market failure. As Williamson 
has pointed out, internalized forms of production do not come without cost. Removing 
transactions from markets and organizations may also experience serious incentive and 
bureaucratic disabilities.[63]In addition, mutually advantageous opportunities for the trading of 
know-how will not be realized unless the institutional framework exists to provide the appropriate 
linkage mechanisms and governance structures to identify trading opportunities and surround and 
protect the associated know-how transfers,[64] which also causes an increase in the external 
transaction cost. The increase in the transaction cost from MNCs inside and outside forces MNCs 
to seek the external support. 
  
Out of the purpose of protecting their ownership advantages, MNCs demand more and more for 
cooperation with local governments or cooperation between governments to settle down the 
problem of the market failure. From the global perspective, what MNCs needed most is to copy 
with “imperfect market” of intangible assets existed in the developing countries. This is because 
developed countries have established a relatively strong IPP system based on their long history 
of IPP while there is a relative weak IPP or even no IPP system among developing countries, 
which would hurt MNCs largely. 
  
3. Difficulties in Multinational Negotiation on IPP 
  
Considering the characteristics of MNCs’ ownership advantages, it is the most beneficial for 
MNCs to establish a widely global system to protect MNCs’ ownership advantages because 
MNCs could access to worldwide markets to spread their cost of innovation to the greatest extent. 
In fact, a number of large MNCs with a particular interest in protecting their intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) played a major role in the multinational negotiations which led to the Trade-relative 
intellectual properties (TRIPs) agreement during the Uruguay Round. For example, the special 
view of IPRs produced by MNCs has subsequently become the potential set of global norms lying 
at the heart of the TRIPs agreement.[65] The purpose of MNCs’ active participation in 
multinational negotiation is to extend IPP to countries that currently provide it only weakly or not 
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market. At a result, the new section of the GATT Uruguay Round agreement on TRIPs reflected 
the demand of developed countries for IPP such that countries must give twenty-year patent 
protection for almost all inventions, products and processes in almost all fields of technology, and 
meanwhile, worldwide standards on IPP are coupled with stricter enforcement and effective 
dispute settlement promoted by the U.S. and widely endorsed by most Developed Countries. 
  
With regard to developing countries, it seems beneficial too to build up a global IPP system. First, 
Effective IPP benefits developing countries to attract more FDI, promote their economic growth 
and also encourage domestic investments in innovation. A large evidence shows that MNCs are 
reluctant to build their plants or issues their licenses in countries where their technology and 
know-how are not protected effectively because MNCs exports their products based on IPRs in 
order to recover costs of developing the property and to prevent counterfeiting and piracy. 
  
Moreover, IPP can lead to more technology transfer. Taylor presented a simple dynamic model of 
endogenous growth to examine the role IPRs play in world trade, growth, and technology 
transfer. If innovators can carry their research technologies across borders, then technology 
transfer creates a region of factor price equalization, an improvement in the allocation of the 
world’s technical resources, and, in many cases, a rise in world growth. These benefits, however, 
will fail to accrue if countries offer only partial protection for IP. If foreign made innovations could 
not be protected, asymmetric protection distorts natural trade patterns, leads innovators to 
comply less than best practice research methods, and lowers aggregate R&D.[66]
  
Third, many governments contend that weak or nonexistent patent protection distorts natural 
trading patterns and reduces the ability of firms to transfer technology abroad. Lee and Mansfield 
first carried out the empirical relationship between a country’s system of IPP and the volume and 
composition of U.S. FDI in that country. The results proved the proposition that a country’s 
system of IPP influences the volume and composition of U.S. FDI. Meanwhile the authors pointed 
out that it should be recognized that a country’s system of IPP is “inextricably bound up with its 
entire legal and social system and its attitudes toward private property” rather than the mere 
passage of a patent or copyright law.[67]
  
However, there are still a number of debates on IPP in the multinational system. The focus lies in 
that it is not sure whether to build up IPP system or enforce the laws or rules about IPP would 
benefit further developing countries or not depending on the following “costs” in spite of the 
existed interests above for developing countries. 
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information. Developed countries seek maximum protection while developing countries claim that 
they are entitled to special treatment to encourage the creation and development of indigenous 
technology. Chin and Grossman found that the interests of the north and the south are generally 
opposed based on a North-South Cournot duopoly model and concluded that unless northern 
R&D is very productive in lowering unit production costs, the southern government’s best policy is 
to “look the other way” while southern firms infringe on northern IP.[68] In addition, those 
provisions of TRIPs were extremely controversial in many less developed countries such as India 
and Brazil. Comparing with the developed countries, the IPP provided by developing countries 
has tended to be shorter in duration, less comprehensive and much less vigorously enforced. 
Since the move to common world standards in the TRIPs section of the Uruguay Round GATT 
agreement does not involve significant increases in IPP by the developed countries, it is very 
likely those developing countries as a group will lose from the worldwide standards on IPP.[69]
  
Second, developing countries may compete for free lunch from northern public-good-like IPRs 
rather than cooperate among themselves. The public-good-like feature of northern IPRs causes a 
free-rider problem among southern countries with respect to protection for northern IPRs. Once 
IPRs are created, it could be accessed by southern country very freely. Usually there are two 
kinds of free-riders problems. One is that the south as a whole free rides on the north for 
technology needed by both of them. The other is that which southern countries should be 
responsible for providing legal protection for northern IPRs. Although there may be mutual gains 
between the North and the south, it requires joint efforts of southern countries to exploit them. 
Forcing a single southern country or a small group of southern countries to raise their protection 
likely will hurt them, which largely explains why southern countries are reluctant to raise their 
protection unilaterally. Moreover, the net gains for northern countries from forcing some southern 
countries to raise their protection are probably small, owing to the offsetting effects of free-
riding.[70] Thus, the protection provided by southern countries for northern IPP is insufficient. For 
example, U.S. used their considerable market power to force some developing countries to 
enforce IPP, but in fact, the actual result of IPP is far from the target. After all, free riding on 
other’s IP and the profit from piracy still outweigh the liberal norm of respect for property 
rights.[71]
  
Third, a relatively high level of political integration is needed to undertake at the outset of 
cooperation between developing countries. Developing countries of different developing level are 
likely to opt for different strategies. Developing country of the higher developed economy is likely 
to pursue an “expansive” strategy (in nature aiming at an absolute increase in gains among 
countries of the region), and on the reverse, the less developed country would like to pursue a 
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Efforts based on less comprehensive political integration are more likely to be subject to a 
disintegrative dynamic.[72] With regard to IPP, it is almost impossible for all developing countries 
to cooperate each other without the base of high level of comprehensive political integration. 
  
In addition, few demand for IPP comes from developing countries MNCs, which also leads to 
non-cooperation between developing countries and developed countries. Not all of MNCs will 
produce the demand for IPP. Kumar argued that Third world MNCs do not manufacture new 
products, but rather sell those products for which technology has been standardized. These firms 
do not have the advantage of familiar brand names and consequent consumer loyalties. As a 
rule, third world firms do not have access to the latest manufacturing technologies and do not 
operate in technology-intensive industries. The marketing and management skills of these MNCs 
are not strong either, at least as compared with MNCs from industrialized countries. Ownership-
specific variables usually stressed as assets of MNCs can hardly explain the overseas expansion 
of third World firms. Perhaps the most important strength of third world firms lies in their less 
advanced, though not necessarily less efficient, manufacturing technologies, which function 
reasonably well in other developing countries. The second and perhaps equally important asset is 
their lower overhead and expatriate costs, different from those firms from industrialized states 
who usually have high cost of the above. Besides the above two assets, third world MNCs also 
have an advantage in their familiarity with developing countries to help them easily establish 
rapport with their employees, local businessmen, and governmental authorities, which made 
industrialized MNCs exasperating.[73] Due to not owning many of IPRs by MNCs from 
developing countries, naturally they would not lobby their governments to protect intellectual 
property.  
  
As seen above, it is difficult for MNCs to protect their ownership advantage globally, or the cost is 
a little high, therefore MNCs direct their efforts to regional trade policy. 
  
4. Shift to RTAs 
  
Since the 1980s, MNCs from developed countries have begun to propel actively the RTAs related 
to IPP. Some American industry association in service, investment, high-technology, agricultural 
chemical, pharmaceutical, and entertainment sectors lobbied Congress for more effective IPP 
abroad.[74] In Europe, “There was increasing political activity of these French and German MNCs 
at the EC level in emerging and stronger EC policy networks and communities. The firm’s 
participation and influence were strongest in EC technology policy communities dealing with 
collaborative R&D projects.”[75] As for APEC, ABAC, the representatives of big business, has 
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services, and capital. It has also demanded common product standards, harmonized customs 
procedures, an APEC business visa, a pacific investment code, common rules on the protection 
of IPRs, and the effective monitoring mechanism to ensure that the promises of the integration 
are kept.[76] The members of ABAC are mainly from U.S., Japan and Korea.[77]
  
MNCs active participants in regional IPP are because regional IPP brings about more gains than 
cost. Property-rights theory holds that the impetus and demand for institutional change comes 
from the bottom, that is, from those actors incurring the greatest opportunity cost in the 
institutional status quo. Regional institutional-building may be viewed as an attempt to internalize 
externalities that cross borders within a group of countries. The cost of these externalities 
increases as new technologies raise the potential for gain from market exchange. Thus payoffs to 
regional rules, regulations, and policies are increased. Lance Davis and Douglass North similarly 
argued that the possibility of profits that can not be captured within an existing structure leads to 
the formation of new (or the mutation of old) institutional arrangements[78]. Harold Demsetz’s 
argued that “increased internationalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values, 
changes which stem from the development of new technology and the opening of new markets, 
and changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned”.[79]  Malti argued that as new 
technologies increase the scope of markets beyond the boundaries of a single state, actors who 
stand to gain from wider markets will seek to change an existing governance structure in order to 
realize these gains to the fullest extent. Malti continued that these problems may raise the appeal 
of external safeguards in the form of an integrated governance structure, particularly as both 
efficiency costs of private contractual arrangements and efficiency gains of external safeguard 
increase with greater frequency of transactions. External safeguard can address not only firm-
level problems but also government-level opportunism, thus enabling market players to 
economize optimally on trade and investment transaction costs. 
  
It is also feasible to cooperate with some developing countries. Deardorff argued that it will 
enhance world welfare if the northern code of protection for IPRs is extended to part of the south. 
Under specified circumstances it is not optimal to extend patent protection to all countries of the 
world. Demsetz argued that if all innovation originates in one part of the world, then extending 
patent protection to a broader and broader area does have these two offsetting effects,[80] but 
these are diminishing returns to the first of them, thus at some point the costs due to extending 
monopoly pricing to existing inventions come to outweigh the benefits of generating new 
ones.[81]
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problem among the cooperating parties. If the cooperating southern countries choice to raise their 
protection, both the non-cooperating southern countries and northern countries are better off. 
Otherwise they will be worse off. Cooperation among southern countries can help to achieve 
Pareto efficiency among southern countries. Meanwhile, northern countries can also benefit from 
cooperation among southern countries. However, Pareto efficiency may not have been achieved 
from the global perspective, because southern countries as a whole may still free-ride on northern 
countries for new technology.[82]
  
In fact, some developing countries have been chosen to join some “developed groups”. These 
developing countries have some common features and therefore developed countries are 
extending their RTAs to these developing countries, such as Mexico involvement in NAFTA, 
participation of part of European developing countries in EU and APEC including Southeast Asian 
countries that have shifted their trade policy from import substitution to export orientation, and 
China and Vietnam in transition.  
  
First, these developing countries are or have been liberalizing economic policies and gradually 
accepting the mind of believing in the role of market in the economic life. For example, in the 
past, developing countries refused to issue patents to foreign investors because they believed 
that patent protection provided a temporary monopoly and raises the prices of protected property. 
Other developing countries did offer protection, but on a relatively limited basis. Since the mid-
1980s, these liberalizing developing countries have begun to adopt laws and policies for IPP 
based on a conception common to the industrial world—namely IP as private property instead of 
the “common heritage of mankind.”[83]  
  
Second, these developing countries have had a fast growing market, realistic or potential since 
directing to market-based economic policies, and also have a relatively stable macro-economic 
and political environment fit for operation and management of MNCs in there. MNCs are attracted 
not only to countries with low labor and other costs but also to countries that are stable 
economically and politically, have good physical infrastructure and a skilled labor force, and that 
operate under the rule of law.[84] For example, China has become the largest receipt of FDI in 
the world in recent years because of its lasting and high economic growth and the great potential 
market. 
  
Third, the cost of negotiation with some developing countries is lower for developed countries due 
to the points above. The success of NAFTA as a good example of RTAs between developing and 
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for her low cost of labor.[85]
  
Therefore, RTAs becomes another effective way by which MNCs can realize their goals of 
protecting their IPRs. The higher degree of ownership-specific advantages, the deeper regional 
integration MNCs demand for. Therefore, new regionalism is based on the demand of MNCs for 
IPPs and of new features different from old regionalism, as said before. 
  
IV. The Case of East Asia 
  
1. Slower Regionalism than Regionalization 
  
The process of regionalism is slower than that of regionalization in East Asia.[86] In terms of 
intra-region trade, FDI and production network, the extent of East-Asia regionalization is not lower 
than those of other regions such as EU and NAFTA. However, East-Asia regionalism, especially 
the regional institutional building falls behind the regions above. 
  
Market-driven integration or regionalization has been occurring in East Asia since the mid-1980s 
through increasing trade and investment linkages. In East Asia, one distinctive feature of regional 
integration is that it is driven primarily by cross-border private capital flows searching out 
profitable opportunities, which is called “Market-led” integration. Much literature and data showed 
the fast growth of trade and FDI and the rapid development of regional production network. 
  
First, there has been an increase in intraregional FDI since the beginning of the 1980s. The value 
of FDI inflows from East Asia to other East Asia economies or groups, increased in the 1990s, 
except for China’s FDI to ASEAN and ASEAN’s FDI to China. 
  
Second, East-Asian intraregional trade, especially in components, parts, and inputs is one of the 
prominent feature in the trade field and has grown rapidly. From 1985 to 2001, intraregional 
exports from East Asia (ex Japan) increased almost ten fold and Japan’s exports doubled. This is 
much higher growth than any other region- EU and NAFTA tripled whilst Latin America and South 
Asia quadrupled. 
  
Third, the East-Asian regional production network has been developed, especially in 1990s. In 
the early stages of development, a production network might consist simply of the production of 
one small part or component of a good in a low-cost country and then its re-importation to the 
home country for assembly into the final good. This process has changed over the years so that 
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final product.[87]
  
The greatest contribution to regionalization is from regional MNCs.[88] The emergence of 
regional production centers in several sectors, including electronics and automotive are mainly 
driven by MNCs.[89] Japanese MNCs is the first driver of regionalization (whose role can not be 
taken place by MNCs from any other regional economies till now) and followed by NIEs MNCs. 
Takeshi Aoki argued that “perhaps the most remarkable feature of the third current eave of FDI” 
is that “Japanese affiliates are playing an important role as hubs in the establishment of 
networks.” He also notes that “this is in sharp contrast with U.S. MNCs in Malaysia, which do not 
form networks in spite of the fact that nearly all are producing ICs and semiconductors.”[90]
  
The relationship-based ethnic business network is another effective network of linking regional 
production and trade.[91] This comprises a number of tightly held, medium-sized family-owned 
firms that transcend national boundaries and account for up to 70 percent of the private sector in 
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[92] Based on "natural" 
factors such as geographic proximity, ethnic ties and industrial linkages, Ethnic Chinese networks 
are very good at joining with different forces such as local, Western, and official capital from 
China and other Asian countries. Thus, the ECBN and the regional production network (RPN) 
formed by the Japanese are major economic networks in the Asia Pacific region.[93]
  
Due to the contribution from regional MNCs to regionalization, East-Asia has grown into an 
increasingly interdependent region. Urata argued that for East Asia as a whole, the procurement 
of inputs from East Asia increased from 1985-95 and thus intra regional interdependence 
increased for all economies except Korea and Japan.[94] In fact, driven by Japanese parent 
companies and most recently by an increasing number of NIE-based companies, East Asia is 
developing its own identity, especially in terms of independent economy, and setting itself apart 
from the regional economies of Western Europe and North America.[95]
  
However, East-Asian regionalism or regional institution building has not been developed as well 
as regionalization. According to Viner’s classic economic criteria for a successful custom union, 
East Asia did not meet. Sander argued that so far, regionalism, defined as aiming at 
predominately policy-led integration process, has remained rather “shallow.”[96] Most of actual 
and potential trading arrangements involving East Asian economies are still in the form of 
proposals and studies, or the negotiation stage. Some may never be implemented since there 
remain many unresolved issues, and others may only become implementation agreements 
  23associated with APEC processes. In this sense, East Asian regionalism has been far from 
entering into the stage of deep integration or institutionalization. 
  
Compared with EU, East Asia has not owned a long history of regional integration. In the stage of 
old regionalism, the most salient regionalism is ASEAN. Later on, although new regionalism has 
been grown fast and spread all the over the world, no other regional institutional organizations 
than ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) existed in East Asian region. Three major regional 
countries, that is, Japan, Korea and China, are newcomers to RTAs and they have been 
undergoing a strategic policy change from favoring multilateral approach for global free trade to 
actively participating in regional grouping. Of course, most of East-Asian members joined APEC 
led by U.S. However, APEC is usually said as a “Club of gossip” and not an institutional unity. In 
fact, till now, almost all East-Asian RTA s are mostly established immediately after the financial 
crisis in 1997. In addition, due to diverse social and cultural structure and different level of 
economic development, most East Asian countries have preferred loose and voluntary 
cooperation schemes without treaties or institutionalized arrangements. It is very difficult for East 
Asia to copy EU. 
  
Even a good example of the recent institutional integration--- ASEAN Ten plus Three, is still a 
goal not a reality of new regionalism, like NAFTA or EU. The establishment of Ten plus Three is 
to ultimately create a single common market, common union and perhaps ultimately a political 
union in the East Asian region. According to FTA framework, it still needs ten years for a real 
institutional unity to appear based on the present situation during its construction without 
considering any possible change. Thus East Asian Free Trade Area has a long way to go. 
  
How do we explain the phenomenon of slower regionalism than regionalization? This paper 
thinks that no full development of regional market-oriented economy leads to the slower process 
of regionalism. 
  
2. Characteristics and Impact of East-Asian Regionalization 
  
East Asian regionalization is based upon diverse industrial structure among members and 
therefore different from EU or NAFTA. The production pattern in EU is a horizontal division of 
production motivated by MNCs and therefore there are common benefits for regional institution 
among these developed members. However, in East Asia the vertical division of production 
propelled by MNCs has been established starting from the 1980s. It is led to by the pressure of 
the going-up cost, especially the cost of labor in one country where MNCs have to shift their 
labor-intensive production base to the host of low-cost labor. This process was held by the 
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cost labor in the less developed countries, while technology-intensive operations remained in the 
advanced nations. Thus, with the continuous shifting of production across countries, East Asia 
becomes mainly the base of production, especially the labor-intensive production rather than 
market. Based on such a production pattern, there is seldom common interest for regional 
institutionalization among members. 
  
At present, Japan is the only one economy in East Asia that owns the independent R&D 
capabilities. Japanese firms possessed the ability to absorb and improve upon foreign technology 
through indigenous R&D and the presence of innovative component manufacturers. As early as 
the 1920s and 1930s, Japan commenced its innovation in the electronics industry and got some 
significant breakthroughs in areas such as the reception of TV signals and antennae technology 
as well as the development of materials such as ferrite. In the 1940s Japanese firms created the 
institutional framework and knowledge which played an important role in indigenizing foreign 
technology in the postwar period.[97] Therefore industrialization in Japan had a strong indigenous 
innovative base prior to the dramatic change in Japan’s global economic presence in the 
1950s.[98] In the mid-1980s, Japan entered new development cycle. Dunning argued that two 
things happened to Japan. First the ownership-specific advantages of a country’s MNEs become 
more firm specific (i.e. of a transaction cost minimizing kind) and less country specific (i.e. asset 
based). Second, the locational decisions by both foreign and domestic MNEs become less based 
on the comparative advantage of factor endowments, and more on the strategies of competitors 
supplying regional or global markets, the desire to fully exploit the economies of large scale 
production, the need to reduce market instabilities and uncertainty, and the incentive to reap the 
gains from integrating related activities over space.[99] Till now Japan has exported high value-
added commodities made using domestic high technology, such as computers and integrated 




By contrast, Korea and Taiwan did not have the similar domestic capabilities. Katz argued that 
fundamentally, the industrial technology development (ITD) process for developing countries is 
based more on learning than innovation[100]. Amsden also made a similar conclusion after 
comparing the industrialization of Taiwan and Korea with that of developed countries. Cyhn held 
that one essential key to Korea’s rapid industrialization has been the successful learning of 
foreign technologies.[101] Usually, developing countries had weak indigenous innovative 
capabilities in the early phase of industrialization and placed heavy reliance upon foreign 
technologies. Copying, reverse engineering, and adaptive imitation are the major means of 
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Taiwan, late-industrializing countries were the first to attempt to penetrate world export markets 
with little more comprehensive advantage than low wages.”[103] Although there have been 
significant increases in R&D spending in both Korea and Taiwan since the Plaza Agreement, the 
“dependent” nature has not been changed a lot, as evidenced by the steady expansion of both 
Taiwanese and Korean bilateral deficits with Japan. Bernard and Ravenhill argued that 
dependence can also inhabit indigenous innovation or, as is often the case in East Asia where 
foreign suppliers of key inputs are also competitors, delay supply of new technologies and 
therefore affect the speed with which new products are developed and marketed and even give 
rise to political problems.[104] Till now Korean and Taiwanese firms in export industries similar to 
Japan’s have lacked comparable innovative capacity and relied disproportionately on original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) (See table 4).[105]
  
In Southeast Asia, the basis of industrialization is even weaker than the Korea and Taiwan. 
Yoshihara’s comment that Southeast Asian region has experiences “technologyless” 
industrialization is still largely applicable. In contrast to the Northeast Asian experience, there is a 
very heavy dependence on subsidiaries of transnational corporations for these manufactured 
exports. The foreign subsidiaries in those export processing zones (EPZs) lack backward 
linkages with the local economies. The participation of local in the sense of domestically owned 
firms in these networks is far less widespread in Southeast Asian than in Korea and 
Taiwan.[106] This method of development usually severely limits local participation in design-
making. A few subsidiaries companies, mainly in Singapore, have evolved into regional 
headquarters or hubs for the distributed R&D activities of the corporation. However, in Thailand 
and Malaysia, most MNC subsidiaries have not yet reached this stage and in Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam they are even further behind. Learning within Southeast Asian MNC 
subsidiaries has been a long-term process, in many cases occurring over twenty years or 
more.[107] More severely, as technology sophistication increases, the ability of local personnel to 
handle the technology and its associated processes declines.[108] In short, East Asian firms 
except for Japan’s, by and large, remain small latecomer players, rather than major technology 
leaders or followers. 
  
The impact of the present East Asian production pattern on the process of regionalization is that 
East Asia economies can not make a great progress in deepening regional market. As a 
production base, the industrial structure is just the result that Japanese domestic production is 
extended to the East Asian region. To a great degree, this kind of extension is not involved in 
many elements of market. Therefore, it could not cause East Asian economies to orientate the 
regional market although East Asian economies are or having been liberalizing their own policies. 
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capabilities to integrating regional economy and hence does not demand for deepening market. 
On the contrary, in order to attract capital and resolve the employment issue, there existed a little 
“beggar-the-neighbor policy” among members. All these show the low extent of regional 
marketization in East Asia despite of high level of regionalization similar to that of EU and NAFTA 
. 
Table 4 European, US and Japanese PC/telecom manufacturers moving into Taiwan, Korea, and 
China 





Semiconductors  IBM (USA)  Mosel Vitelic Inc. Taiwan  DRAM production 
outsourced 
Semiconductors Philips  TSMC  Taiwan  Invested 
2000 
PC Compaq  (USA)  Inventee  Taiwan  Expanded 
outsourcing PC 
production 







for mobile handsets 
Fujitsu Winbond 
Electronics 
Taiwan License  provision 
and production 
outsourcing 
Handsets Ericsson  (Sweden)  GVC  Taiwan  OEM 
Handsets Motorola  (USA)  BenQ  Taiwan  OEM 
Handsets Nokia  (Finland)  Han  Hai 
Precision 
Industry 
Taiwan Improved  production 














SMIC: Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. 
  27SRAM for handsets: memory that enables simultaneous read/write without the need of storage 
activity. 
Source: “Digital Economy in East Asia,” FIF Special Report No.6 vol.2, 2002, from  Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, "White Paper on International Trade", Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 
  
3. Regional MNCs’ Demands for RTAs: as an Example of IPP 
  
Firstly, Japan, as the most developed countries, has not strong demand for IPP due to its 
structure of production similar to other East Asian members. The East Asian region has been 
regarded by Japanese not as its target of market but as the base of production. The purpose of 
Japan transforming its industries to East Asia is to produce the products at the cost as low as 
possible and compete in the international market with those products of U.S. and EU. Lipsey 
argued that as earlier major investors, Japanese and U.S. firms differed in many aspects. In 
terms of industrial sifting, U.S. investments and affiliate exports were distributed across industries 
along lines of U.S. comparative advantage, while the industry distribution of Japanese affiliate 
production and exports was closer to that of the host countries. In terms of sale orientation, U.S. 
had changed its role from transmitting home country technologies and comparative advantages to 
accessing to host countries’ market of growing faster, while Japanese affiliates replace the export 
role of U.S. affiliates in East Asia.[109] Due to Japanese regarding the East Asia as the 
production base rather than the market, Japan MNCs did not need to use their ownership 
advantages to compete with others in East Asia. Furthermore, Japanese MNCs have put up 
private institutional arrangements in place to cope with the risks involved in regional trade and 
investment: creation of supplier network,[110] supplier cooperation clubs and Japanese General 
trading companies, and also built strong marketing networks that facilitated worldwide brand 
recognition. At the same time, the local firms have the weaker capabilities of production and it is 
hard for them to copy Japanese products. The long-term vertical division of production pattern 
proved that East Asia has not had the adequate capabilities to catch up with the Japanese 
abilities of high technology. Therefore, Japanese MNCs are not worried about the copy of its 
technology and seldom produces demand for IPP. 
  
Secondly, other East Asian members have little ownership advantages and seldom demand for 
IPP. For most of East-Asian economies, “intra-regional firms are not regionalized but regional at 
best.” Dicken, et al argued that “Regional solution” is preferred by emerging MNCs from Asian 
newly industrial economies that lack ownership-specific advantages to compete with global MNCs 
in their “home turf”. On the one hand, they have neither sufficient capital nor strong brand names 
to compete with leading MNCs. On the other hand, they are reluctant to go beyond the Asian 
region because their competitive advantage is largely embedded in the region. They are mostly 
  28Asian firms with international operation, not reverse. Asian MNCs find it difficult to give up 
privileged access to markets and information in Asia, to transplant their business networks 
successful in the other triad regions.[111] The main reason lies in the lack of technology to 
integrate their home production activities to other regions. Some research concluded that total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth played a surprisingly small role in East Asian 
success.[112] Totally, they have few ownership-specific advantages and naturally demand little 
for local governments to cooperation or between governments to keep their ownership-specific 
advantages. 
  
Thirdly, demand for East Asia IPP is from the region outside, mainly from U.S. After the decades’ 
development, East Asia has become one of main regions of the fast growing potential market. In 
order to access to this regional market, at the behest of various U.S. corporate interests, the U.S. 
have initiated bilateral investment treaties with some Asian developing economies such as 
Singapore, China, Taiwan and Korea since 1980s, and achieved quick results by linking higher 
levels of protection to trade issues through section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. These treaties 
define “investment” to include intellectual property and provide national and MFN treatment for 
FDI, and others. The treaties generally grant U.S. firm more protection than they had under the 
previous national laws of the treat partners.[113]These bilateral treaties brought limited results, 
especially in the area of enforcing the IPP. Later on, U.S. hopes to enter into the whole regional 
market and initiated a trans-Pacific organization---APEC. In APEC, U.S. insisted to fasten the 
pace of market opening to outside, especially East Asian region. Some suggestions were 
provided including Bogor Declaration in 1994 and EVSL in 1997. However, U.S. met the strong 
opposition from East Asian members, particularly Japan. At a result, these plans ended in defeat. 
  
Based on the situation above, East Asian regionalization driven by MNCs in fact is a unilateral 
action that means MNCs shift their production base from developed countries to developing 
countries in one direction rather than bilateral flow. Thus East Asia regionalism built up on this 
basis also is an individual action, rather than collective action or members differed in their 
interests of demands for regionalism largely. Yamazawa argued that regionalization in East Asia 
is a market-driven integration without a formal institutional framework: no region-wide attempt has 
ever been made to liberalize trade.[114] East Asian members opened their market in exchange 
for their own economic growth, not building a regional integrating market. Thus in many 
situations, “competition” for liberalization policy is far more important than cooperation of policy 
among member. Malti held that little scope for mutually beneficial exchange exists and demand 
for integration by market across is consequently weak such as ASEAN where their companies 
compete in the same industrial sectors with each other. 
  
  29Due to this shallow level of marketization, till now, East Asia regionalism is still a “Mix” which has 
features of both old and new regionalism. From the perspective of old regionalism, major East 
Asian RTAs are still driven by governments as both the demander and supplier. Evan argued that 
the drivers behind East Asian regionalism tend to be officials and academics and only 
occasionally business interests; they do not command consistent high-level political attention or 
widespread public interest.[115] For example, after the financial crises in 1997, there has been 
growing concern and recognition by the East Asian leaders that a major regional crisis can not 
handle by any single state, hence the gradual emergence of East Asian regionalism. However, 
East Asian RTAs did not have the institutional feature of old regionalism. From the point of view 
of new regionalism, East Asia RTAs are not driven by the forces from the bottom largely, but the 
outcome of political cooperation are not involved many contents of deepening regional market. 
Sometimes, it is thought that the emergence and development of East Asian new regionalism is 
devoted mainly to response to the extra-regional challenges[116] rather than of its own wish. 
  
4. The Future of Regionalism in East Asia 
  
East Asian regionalism needs to resolve the following structural problems such as transforming 
the economic structure from the production base to the market; establishing the regional market 
institution and encouraging innovative activities. However, some good signs have shown changes 
in regional structure. 
  
First, China has emerged not only as a production base but also as a rising market with the rapid 
economic growth. In 2003, import form China has surpassed that from Japan and became the 
third import market. For another example, Japan has been importing increasingly from China, 
which drove China to replace the U.S.A. as Japan's leading trade partner since 2002. China’s 
structural change would cause the regional transformation, which would alter the East Asian ideal 
together with other East Asian members.    
  
Second, East Asian firms, especially developing economies, is accumulating their own ownership 
advantages through both continuous import of high technology and developing their own 
domestic capabilities. Many Korean and Taiwanese companies have made significant progress in 
industrial deepening, in applying advanced technologies, and in upgrading the skills of their labor 
force. Meanwhile Korean firms are attempting to become “technologically independent”, as a way 
for them to become more competitive than before,[117] and establish a number of research 
centers established world-wide. 
  
  30Third, With the East Asian capabilities increasing and the intensive competition of regional 
market, Japan is improving it’s the level of transferring technology (See table 5) from low-value 
added to high; from simple training of personnel to comprehensive; from no local R&D to building 
up local R&D centers. 
  
The regional market forces, as the driver and demander of East Asian regionalism, are increasing 
gradually. In fact, developing countries have begun to encounter new problems as their 
enterprises have expanded to manufacture technologically sophisticated goods for export. For 
example, computers exported from Taiwan have been copied by companies in England, the PRC, 
and Southeast Asia, then turning the tables on the old pattern: “before they copied others, now 
others copy them.” In response to domestic demand from large well-established export-oriented 
enterprises in Taiwan, three industrial organizations have lobbied for policy changes to curb 
piracy and counterfeiting of Taiwanese goods.[118] As more developing countries’ domestic 
industries suffer from a lack of adequate IPP and as their high value-added export products that 
incorporate IPRs come to be pirated, these industries will support stronger enforcement in some 
industries. The examples such as Videotape movie producers and record producers in the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Korea, Computer associations in Malaysia and Thailand have all 
demonstrated an interest in stronger standards of IPP. 
  
With the accumulation of ownership advantage in East Asia, the mutual demand for IPP will go up 
and therefore drive East Asian regional institution further. In the future, East Asia will enter into 
the stage of the real new regionalism in spite of a long-run process. 
  
Table 5 Stages of Japanese MNC activity in Pacific Asia: impacts upon technology transfer and 
“hollowing out” in Japan 








Stage III: 1993-2000 (export-
platform factories with broader 
range of sophisticated 
assembly production ) 
1. Technology transfer 




Low added-value  More value-added  More value-added 
Training of local 
personnel 





  31Localization of 
management 
Joint venture but little 
localization 
100% Japanese 





Absent Commencement  of 
local design and 
development centres
Increasing use of local design 




Absent  Largely absent  Commencement of local R&D 
centres in certain locations 
(b)from Asian subsidiary to local non-Japanese companies 
   Absent, little use of 
local suppliers 
Increasing use of 
local Japanese 
suppliers 
Increasing use of Pan-Asian 
supply management, and OEM 
arrangements with NIEs 
2.Impact upon “hollowing out” in Japan” 
   Little impact, except 
in textiles and 
‘smoke-stack’ 
industries 
Increasing shift of 
production to Asia; 
higher emphasis on 
added-value 
production in Japan 
Many Japanese firms begin to 
specialize in production only for 
domestic market 
Source: Roger Hayter and David W. Edgington, “Flying Geese in Asia: The Impacts of Japanese 
MNCs as A Source of Industrial Learning”, Tijdchrift Economische en Sociale Geografie-2004, 




The emergence and development of new regionalism is, to a great extent, related to the situation 
that MNCs wish to enter into developing countries’ markets. However, it is not easy for MNCs to 
access to this developing market. MNCs still have to be faced with the great challenge brought 
about by both their public-good-like ownership advantages and increasing cost of producing 
ownership advantages. If MNCs did not extend their market to developing countries, they would 
not realize the purpose to spread the cost of producing ownership advantages. However, if they 
did, they would face the risk of losing their ownership advantage due to free riding problem 
among developing countries without effective IPP. Therefore, MNC are attempting to build up the 
multilateral framework to resolve this puzzle. However, this process is not going very smoothly 
and thus they direct their efforts towards RTAs, which drive the rising of new regionalism.  
  
With regard to the case of East Asian region, East Asian special production pattern which is 
vertical division of labor and production base leads to low extent of regionalization and also 
  32demands little for regional institutionalization, at least from the demand perspective of regional 
integration. Almost of East Asian RTAs is demanded and supplied by the governments, similar to 
the model of old regionalism. Due to lack of common interest, especially in IPP, there is not a real 
example of new regionalism in East Asia. East Asia needs to resolve some regional structural 
problems such as transforming the economic structure from the production base to the market; 
establishing the regional market institution and encouraging innovative activities. With the 
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